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Statistical Inference 
and Evidence-Based Science
I presume that many readers may have heard some variation of the quote, 
attributed to British Prime Minister Benjamin Disreali and popularized by Ameri-
can humorist, Mark Twain (a.k.a., Samuel Clemens), when referring to confusion 
generated by the use and misuse of quantitative figures. “There are three kinds of 
mistruth: lies, damned lies, and statistics” (Twain, 1906).
One of the “rites of passage” associated with obtaining a graduate degree is 
being required to complete multiple statistics classes. I try to sympathize with my 
current students when I reflect on how little I could recall after finishing my first 
course in tests and measurements as an undergraduate. During my Masters program 
at Purdue University, I gained a completely undeserved reputation for being a “sta-
tistics whiz,” bestowed upon me by my fellow student and oft co-conspirator, Larry 
Bruya (who fulfills my personal definition of a “true friend” wherein a “friend” is 
said to be one who will bail you out of jail, while a “true friend” is one who sits 
in the jail cell with you and proclaims, “Golly, that was fun!”). Larry and I took 
the same first-level statistics class together at Purdue and in the evenings while 
studying, he would quiz me about what each day’s topic meant. I was too dumb to 
realize that Larry wasn’t asking rhetorical questions to challenge me, but that he 
really didn’t know the answers. I figured I didn’t want to appear stupid, so I started 
concocting answers and in the process figured out how to actively learn statistics! 
Thanks, Larry. There is a sequel to this story decades later. Whenever I make some 
kind of pronouncement in his presence, Larry has learned to inquire, “Do you 
really know the answer or are you just making that up?!” Such an inquiry never 
fails to result in gales of laughter while Larry explains to whoever is gathered our 
personal story about what he affectionately calls “making up crap about statistics.”
An important realization to come from any discussion about statistics, with 
or without any notion of lying or even just “making up crap,” is that comprehend-
ing statistics can legitimately be quite confusing, even to those with some basic 
knowledge. They can be utterly mystifying to those without a degree of quantita-
tive literacy in probability, laws of chance, and elementary statistical procedures. 
Worse, when statistics have been misused (say it ain’t so!) simply to support one’s 
preconceived opinion, all trust in them can go right out the window so that the 
validity of all statistics becomes suspect.
Statistics as Tools
There are all sorts of numbers that pass for statistics, rightly or wrongly: Individual 
scores, percentages, percentiles, standard scores, means, medians, modes, ranges, 
standard deviations, variances, T scores, t tests, analysis of variance, correlation, 
multivariate analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, and multiple regression, 
ad infinitum. An important first realization is that any statistic is merely a tool like 
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a hammer, screwdriver, shovel, or rake. Like any tool, a statistic can be both used 
and misused. Applying the appropriate statistic to the right research question is 
critical in scientific study. That necessitates fundamental knowledge about many 
kinds of statistics. As the old saying goes, “If your only tool is a hammer, every-
thing begins to look like a nail!” I cannot possibly and do not intend to overview 
everything that is important about statistics in these several editorial pages. I am 
addressing several notions that do apply to the scientific rigor associated with 
research papers submitted to and published by this particular scholarly journal. 
For more sophisticated understanding of statistics, I encourage readers to seek out 
various print and online statistical sources including the Publication Manual of 
the American Psychological Association (6th ed., 2010). Chapter 5, “Displaying 
Results” (pp. 125-167) presents an important summary of how to analyze and 
present the statistical results of many different kinds of study.
Descriptive Vs. Inferential Statistics 
It may be helpful to consider that all statistics (remember that does not mean all 
numbers) can be categorized into one of two groups: descriptive statistics and 
inferential statistics. I realize that there are also parametric and nonparametric 
statistics, subcategories of inferential statistics, and I am certain there are other 
ways to categorize different statistics. For my discussion purposes, I think these 
two groupings will suffice. 
Descriptive Statistics. For most individuals the most straightforward way to 
summarize or capture the essence of a group of numbers is by using descriptive 
statistics. Examples of descriptive statistics include measures of central tendency 
(i.e., mean, median, mode) and measures of variability (i.e., range, standard 
deviation, variance, standard errors) along with simple percentages, percentiles, 
standard scores, and correlations. The purposes of descriptive statistics are to 
summarize for a reader the score characteristics of a group or sample of numbers 
as well as to provide some insight into the scores achieved by individuals within 
that group. True to their name, they simply describe and summarize the group of 
numbers: what the distribution of numbers looks like, where its middle score lies, 
how spread out the scores are, and whether scores are related or associated with 
other scores.
Importantly, individual descriptive statistics do not, by themselves, give one 
enough information to generalize those numbers or scores to other groups beyond 
the immediate sample. They also can be misleading when used in isolation or inap-
propriately. For example, knowing the mean of a group of scores tells the reader 
only where the arithmetic average of those scores falls. If the sample of scores 
is skewed (i.e., asymmetric with outlying scores higher or lower than the mean), 
then the mean does not give a very appropriate picture of the middle of the group 
of numbers. 
Importantly, the actual way that the numbers are being used, the so-called 
measurement scale associated with the four qualities of the real number system, 
makes a huge difference in how they should be summarized. I come across 
misunderstandings and misuses of this constantly. For example, when someone 
administers a Likert scale survey question, the resulting scores typically represent 
“ordinal scale” numbers, which only possess two of the four characteristics of a 
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real number. Ordinarily, one should not calculate means and standard deviations or 
parametric statistics for rank ordered Likert scale data, especially because these data 
also may be skewed. Instead, for ordinal scale numbers, the median or mode and 
range of scores along with nonparametric inferential statistics should be employed.
It is customary and certainly appropriate to present measures of central ten-
dency and variability in research studies, although both, not just one, should be used 
together to describe the characteristics of the group of scores obtained. At the same 
time, if descriptive statistics alone are calculated and presented, the results from 
the sample in a study may not (please note my emphasis!) be used to generalize the 
results to other situations or other samples. When one relies solely on descriptive 
statistics, conclusions may represent only W.A.S.G. (“wild ass scientific guesses”; 
Pia, personal communication), which may very well lead to the same estimates one 
would make without calculating any statistics whatsoever!
Inferential Statistics. Generalizing results requires the application of inferential 
statistics such as t-tests, ANOVA, or multiple regression. As straightforward as 
descriptive statistics can be, inferential statistics can be complicated and complex, 
both to calculate and to understand. They draw upon the well established, but oft 
poorly understood, laws of probability and chance. If appropriately calculated and 
interpreted, they should allow someone to understand how well the results of one 
study may apply to the results of other studies and situations.
The cornerstone of inferential statistics lies in a solid understanding of probabil-
ity that can answer this question: To what degree are the results under consideration 
trustworthy (i.e., valid or accurate and reliable or consistent and repeatable) and not 
just a chance occurrence? Fortunately, astute statisticians (e.g., Sir Ronald Fisher) 
have described score distributions that allow us to make appropriate judgments 
about the degree to which a result may be simply luck (i.e., a chance occurrence) 
or whether it is trustworthy and generalizable.
Modern inferential statistics can be a literal “Tower of Babel” because of their 
sophistication and complexity. Using powerful modern computing technology, new 
ways of calculating statistics are ever evolving. We can now calculate on our desktop 
or laptop computers in minutes what would have required me nights and nights of 
work on a mainframe computer when I was in graduate school. Regardless of the 
sophistication of the statistical software, there are some universal principles we 
can consider about how we know if we should generalize results. 
Errors in Statistical Conclusions. First and foremost, we must ask the Type I 
error question: To what degree do I have confidence that I am correctly choosing 
to accept a certain outcome and that outcome is in fact not a chance occurrence? 
I like to think of this first principle in terms akin to how the judicial system in the 
U.S. establishes criminal innocence or guilt: The accused person is judged to be 
innocent until proven guilty. Similarly, the inferential system assumes that a result 
is a chance occurrence (i.e., innocent) unless we can prove that results are highly 
unlikely (i.e., guilty). Most readers will recognize the alpha (α) level of 0.05 as the 
traditional degree of chance that researchers require before assuming nonchance 
findings.
The second related inferential question is called the Type II error question: 
To what degree have I tested a sufficiently large sample and am using sensitive 
enough measures that I can identify a meaningful, nonchance difference? A recent 
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 requirement in scholarly journals that follow the American Psychological Asso-
ciation protocols is that measures of statistical power be tested and identified in 
a paper along with the alpha level. While we have not always required statistical 
power to be calculated in the past, that is one requirement that will be enforced in 
the future to allow us to remain in compliance with APA.
One other final minor controversy has arisen related to how we should detect 
and describe the existence of significant differences. My own traditional statistical 
training basically requires the investigator to compare a so-called ρ, or probability 
level, with the traditional α < 0.05. More contemporary approaches are advocat-
ing the use of confidence intervals, or estimates of the range in which significantly 
different values may fall. In point of fact, both p values and confidence intervals 
provide exactly the same statistical inference information in slightly different ways. 
They both require an understanding of how to avoid both Type I and Type II errors.
In our ongoing mission to provide the very best and strongest aquatic literature, 
the International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education strives to publish 
the strongest scholarly research possible. This means that while we have and will 
occasionally publish descriptive work as appropriate, more and more we will be 
expecting authors to employ contemporary and appropriate inferential statistical 
procedures so that our readers can be assured that published findings in fact reflect 
the most rigorous scientific evidence and results.
Welcome Kevin and Bob
As I mentioned last issue, the International Journal of Aquatic Research and Edu-
cation would be welcoming new members to our Editorial Board as we increase 
our international diversity, enhance the expertise related to recent popular topics 
being published in the Journal, and not overburden members who have already 
served a term. Alert readers already may have noticed the changes to the Editorial 
Board membership indicated on the back cover of this issue. I hope Editorial Board 
members, readers, subscribers, authors, and reviewers of IJARE will join me in 
welcoming Dr. Kevin Moran, principal lecturer in education at the University of 
Auckland, New Zealand, and Dr. Robert Keig Stallman, emeritus professor from 
the Norwegian School of Sports Science, Oslo, Norway, as the newest members of 
the Editorial Board. Both of these new Board members are contributors to IJARE as 
frequent authors and reviewers. They also possess expertise in very timely areas of 
drowning prevention and learning to swim. They both enjoy a well-deserved inter-
national reputation as very thoughtful and reflective scientists as well as individuals 
with a well developed sense of scientific curiosity. Welcome aboard, Kevin and Bob!
Steve Langendorfer, Editor 
International Journal 
of Aquatic Research and Education
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